

**LA CITOYENNETÉ MULTICULTURELLE 25 ANS APRÈS / MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP 25 YEARS LATER**

18-19 Novembre 2021 / November 18-19, 2021
Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne

JEUDI 18 NOVEMBRE

9h-9h15 : Accueil des participants / *Welcoming of the participants*

9h15-10h : Introduction du colloque / Introduction to the conference
Organisateurs et Michel Wieviorka (EHESS)

10h-11h :

Will Kymlicka (Université Queen's)
Multiculturalism and The Ethics of Membership
Modérateur / Chair : François Boucher

11h-11h30 : *Pause café / Coffee break*

11h30-13h : *Les odyssees multiculturelles / Multicultural Odysseys*

Modératrice / Chair : Elke Winter

Ryoko Ishikawa (Université de Ritsumeikan) : *A Liberal Multicultural
Alternative to Anglicisation: Examining Claims for Cultural Rights of the
Majority in Japan*

ABSTRACT

Is there a liberal normative ground for the cultural majority to claim their cultural rights? In *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), Will Kymlicka has justified the liberal multiculturalism and rights of the minority cultural groups, but whether this argument can be extended to the cultural majority is not clear. This question has been largely ignored in the cultural rights debate. Unlike minority cultures that face assimilation and domination, it has been taken for granted that the majority culture will prevail without formal institutional arrangements to protect it. Nonetheless, there are increasing instances of majority groups making cultural defenses. For example, the recent influx of immigrants and refugees into Europe makes the cultural majority feel more insecure. Some countries are calling for restrictions on so-called “illiberal” cultural and religious practices to protect liberal political culture.

This paper examines a Japanese example of the majority's cultural rights claims, stemming from globalization, and the dominance of English in the globalized market. Since the 2000s, the Japanese government has introduced educational reforms from primary school to university to improve the English skill levels among people, so that individuals and companies will be more

competitive in the global market. This policy is often referred to as Anglicization. Here, Anglicization means improving people's English language skills as a second language. Conservative nationalists are anxious about this trend and claim that Anglicization will destroy Japanese society. For instance, Teruhisa Se, a liberal nationalist political theorist, writes in *Anglicization Makes the Nation Stupid* (2015) that Anglicization gives more advantage to the elites and increases the economic disparity in society. Also, elites will monopolize knowledge as fewer publications abroad will be translated into Japanese and effectively limit ordinary people's access. As a consequence, Anglicization erodes social solidarity that is essential to make liberal democracy work. Thus, nationalists call for maintaining strict immigration policy and protection of the Japanese language and culture in this age of globalization.

As Se's argument shows, cultural majority's demand for cultural rights tends to be intolerant, xenophobic, and exclusionary. In the name of cultural protection, the cultural majority tries to strengthen their dominance in the society and marginalize minority groups. Some theorists argue that the idea of majority cultural rights is prone to be misused in this way, and thus it is hazardous to liberal societies. Does this imply that instead of adhering to the Japanese culture and language, Japan should move forward with Anglicization? There is no doubt that English is the *de facto* universal language today and a required communication tool for cosmopolitans. Also, Anglicization may help make Japan, which is known to be highly homogenous, more open to diversity. Still, Anglicization is problematic as English is not a neutral language. It is the dominant language globally, but it is a foreign language not used in everyday communication in Japan.

This paper argues that rather than pursuing Anglicization, Japan should aim at making Japanese language and culture more inclusive. To use Kymlicka's terminology, Japan must make its societal culture more open to diversity. For this purpose, this paper first discusses the role of language in democracy from a liberal multiculturalist perspective. Then, the cosmopolitan assumptions behind the Anglicization policy are examined. Finally, the effectiveness of criticism on the majority's cultural rights is considered. This paper concludes that the liberal theory of the majority cultural rights is possible.

Ahmad Bostani (Université de Kharazmi) : *Multicultural Citizenship reconsidered: the Case of Iran*

ABSTRACT

Only a few academic papers have addressed the relevance of Will Kymlicka's theory to Iran. On the other hand, the information and analyses related to the Iranian case in the books edited by Kymlicka are sometimes flawed, for instance considering Arabs in Iran as a "religious minority" (2014: 19) while they are Shi'ite, or using the forged title "Arabistans" in his own introduction (2005: 38) while the correct name is Khuzestan where its population constitutes a mixture of both Arabs and Persian-speakers. Even the only paper related to Iran, written by Elling (2016) did not apply Kymlicka's own theory to Iran. According to my knowledge, the only one who has attempted to do so is Badamchi who, in the conclusion of his paper admitted that this theory is "both theoretically problematic and empirically unfeasible in Iran" (2018:171). In order to demonstrate the inapplicability of the theory of multicultural citizenship to Iran, this paper will be divided into three main sections:

Firstly, I discuss the explanatory capacity of this theory for Iran. I will argue that describing Iran as multinational state with a number of "national minorities" does not exactly

represent its complexities. Over the course of its long history, a lot of overlapping elements have shaped Iran as a nation *avant la lettre*. The name of Iran has repeatedly used in the ancient literature, not only as a geographical unit but also as a cultural continuity. Thus, Iran is neither a recent construct (unlike Iraq and Afghanistan) nor based upon a particular ethnic identity (unlike Turkey and Israel). The term “ethnic,” aside from its ambiguity, does not seem to be able to describe this complexity. Factors such as language, dialect, religion, sect, and so on are so inextricably interwoven that one cannot easily draw boundaries between them in terms of the vague notion of ethnicity.

Secondly, I examine the normative aspect of the theory which is based on the recognition of the right of an ethnic hegemony over particular territories. Several obstacles would be encountered when trying to apply such a separatist model to Iran. Firstly, there are several nations in Iran on the basis of several overlapping factors mentioned above. Additionally, there is no specific boundaries between these groups: several cities and provinces with various languages and ethnic groups and historical immigration of locals across the country (Turk minority in Khorasan, Arab minority in Fars, etc.) are worth mentioning. Moreover, the absence of civil institutions and modern conception of citizenship and individualism in Iranian regions is not deniable. Hence, the lack of a modern nation-state would pave the way for several ethnonationalisms striving to promote pre-modern and tribal traditions. This situation eventually could lead to more ethnic issues (discriminations and oppressions) this time within each newly born nations.

Finally, I would like to provide an alternative account. In Kymlicka’s theory the boundary between “integration” and “assimilation” is blurred. On the other hand, his stress is rather on the actual and fixed elements of identity which could promote more social segmentations, especially in pre-modern communities like Iranian ethnic regions. In the situation of cultural, ethnic, lingual, religious, and racial diversity, the only way to keep the nation together is to stress on the imagined aspects of the nation. Drawing on the theories of (social) imaginary (Ricoeur, Castoriadis, Taylor), I will support an imaginary conception of social integration and the modern nation in Iran.

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Marta dell’Aquila (Université de Tel Aviv) : *Peut-on parler de multiculturalisme latino-américain? / Is There a Latino-American Multiculturalism?*

RÉSUMÉ

Lors des dernières décennies, des dizaines de théories, propositions, projets et mouvements ont émergé faisant appel à la notion de *multiculturalisme*. Dans une perspective politique romantique et idéale, ce modèle politique désignerait une société civilisée qui n'homogénéise pas ses citoyens, mais qui leur permet de vivre ensemble dans la diversité et dans la pluralité, dans un monde multiple d'ethnies, de langues, de coutumes, d'idées et de croyances, avec toute la complexité que cela comporte.

Pour sa diversité culturelle, l'Amérique Latine et les Caraïbes se présente comme une région fertile pour l'application de ces politiques. La *tendance* multiculturelle émerge dans la région à la fin des années 90, de l'exigence de fixer des limites et un équilibre entre un État national aux origines coloniales et les communautés indiennes ancestrales déjà présentes dans ses territoires, dont l'équilibre a été altéré par la colonisation. À partir des années 90, plusieurs réformes constitutionnelles de caractère multiculturel ont été mises en place, afin de garantir la protection des minorités ethniques. L'un des moments-clé de cette transformation a été l'adoption, en 1989, de la Convention 169 de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail (OIT, 1989).

Jusqu'à la fin des années 80, en fait, les identités nationales s'articulaient autour du concept de *métissage* (Wade, 2006), lequel « résulte de la rencontre, du chaos, de la conquête, de l'occidentalisation imposée » (Wieviorka, 2001) ; autrement dit, « une réaction de survie à une situation instable, imprévue et largement imprévisible » (Gruzinski, 1999). Selon l'anthropologue Peter Wade, le noyau de réformes entreprises à partir des années 80 consiste dans : « la reconnaissance du caractère multiculturel de la nation et du caractère collectif distinctif des peuples autochtones ; la reconnaissance du droit autochtone traditionnel ; la reconnaissance des droits de propriété collectifs ; le statut officiel des langues autochtones dans les communautés autochtones ; la mise en place d'un enseignement bilingue » (Wade, 2006).

La raison de ces réformes réside dans plusieurs facteurs : premièrement, de l'intérêt, et du conséquent financement, de certaines organisations de développement – comme la Banque Interaméricaine de Développement (BID), la Banque Mondiale, les Nations Unies et la Fondation interaméricaine – envers les communautés afro-latines. Ces organisations auraient donc influencé « la sensibilité des élites politiques latino-américaines aux pressions d'une « culture politique internationale » et d'un discours sur les droits de l'homme et des minorités » (Van Cott, 2000) ; deuxièmement, de la volonté des États de lutter contre l'exclusion sociale et de créer des régimes plus démocratiques ; finalement, des pressions exercées sur les gouvernements par les mobilisations politiques des mouvements sociaux indiens et noirs.

Le multiculturalisme latino-américain est souvent critiqué, en particulier par les courants décoloniaux d'Amérique Latine, pour être incapable de valoriser la diversité culturelle de la région, jusqu'à la mépriser, et pour reproduire une logique eurocentrique et coloniale.

Avec ma présentation, je me propose premièrement de présenter les origines des tendances multiculturelles latino-américaines dès années 80 et, deuxièmement, d'illustrer la critique décoloniale à ces politiques, se référant, en particulier, à comment celles-ci découlent conceptuellement des Pays occidentaux et renforcent la structure et les principes de l'Etat libéral colonial.

Pour conclure, je montrerai comment, depuis la pensée décoloniale, on propose le concept d'« interculturalité » au lieu de multiculturalisme, qui renvoie « à l'existence et à l'interaction équitable de diverses cultures ainsi qu'à la possibilité de générer des expressions culturelles partagées par le dialogue et le respect mutuel » (UNESCO, 2005), et qui peut être pensé comme un nouveau « projet politique et épistémique » (Walsh, 2005).

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13h-14h30 : Déjeuner / Lunch break

14h30-15h30 :

Tariq Modood (Université de Bristol)
Multiculturalism without Privileging Liberalism
Modératrice / Chair : Isabelle Aubert

15h30-16h30 : *Multiculturalisme et féminisme / Multiculturalism and Feminism*

Marion Godman (Université de Aarhus) : *Why Multiculturalism is Good for Women?*

ABSTRACT

A few years after the publication of Kymlicka's *Multicultural Citizenship*, Susan Moller Okin famously asked: is multiculturalism bad for women? (1999). Okin argued that giving certain groups like national minorities or indigenous communities special group-differentiated rights would often be at the expense of the legitimate universal rights of the women within these groups. She gave a rich set of examples of minority cultures around the world that have led to the subordination and suffering of individual girls and women. Thus, Okin showed us that this concern was not just a matter of an abstract dilemma between multiculturalism and feminism in

political theory but also of a very practical concern of whose interests to prioritise.

So, should feminists endorsing the moral equality of people of all genders, remain skeptical of multiculturalism? Some authors have challenged Okin's view on minority cultures' treatment of women (Nussbaum 1999; al-Hibri 1999) whereas Kymlicka himself in reply to Okin has insisted that there must be "institutional safeguards which prevent groups from imposing internal restrictions' on members" (Kymlicka 1999: 127, fn. 7). I think these replies have merit, but I also think they miss a deeper and more persuasive response available to liberal multiculturalists, which is the focus of my argument here.

Recall that for Kymlicka the attraction of multiculturalism, is that its only within a culture that we have a context for meaningful choices; that is a context models and scripts according to which people can understand, evaluate and pursue their goals (Kymlicka 1995, 89). I contend that the culture we belong to also provides the context for our meaningful choices about *gender*. A gender identity is not something that stands *outside* one's cultural belonging; rather gender categories evolve *within* a particular cultural system of norms and beliefs. More precisely one's culture belonging determines things such as whether one regards gender as a binary option, what the gender norms are and what the relative hierarchy of different genders are (Bach 2012, Godman 2018). The cultural specificity and variation of gender also explains why many feminists have been concerned about the universalist and exclusionary ideas in feminism, such as the predicament of all women being modelled on a western middleclass women's situation (see e.g. Spelman 1988). Certainly, gender is a valuable component of our self-identity worldwide, but it is particular cultures that determines what this identity consists of.

But a cultural system is also not static over time. As it evolves new role models can be introduced and previous hierarchies of gender can be broken down. So, if we, as feminists, want to change the conditions and quality of choices regarding one's gender, I argue, we will need to work through culture not against it. I will illustrate my argument with the case of the recognized Roma minority in Sweden which has been alleged to have a problematic record when it comes to gender. Yet it appears, there are many different routes to change within this culture that are compatible with an overall progressive agenda for feminists. Some individuals may want to exit the minority culture, and should of course be allowed to, but for many individuals the main and desired option will be to retain their membership within their culture but with a reformed gender status or role. This might be promoted by more diverse gender political representation from the Roma or prompting different set of role models. Crucially it is the subordinated gender members of a group that themselves get to identify what change they believe is most feasible and important *within* their (minority) group and culture.

Nadia Mehdi (Université de Sheffield) : *Proposals for an Intersectional Feminist Multiculturalism*

ABSTRACT

Susan Moller Okin (1999) infamously posed the question 'is multiculturalism bad for women?'. She intended to encourage others to critically examine whether the multiculturalist project, in which Western liberal states were granting group rights to minority cultures within their borders, was opposed to the ideals of gender equality that these states also formally endorsed. Focusing

largely on such rights as they pertain to women from minority immigrant communities, she argued that liberal theorists advocating for minority group rights rarely examined the private sphere in which these women were facing severe oppression at the hands of their cultural traditions and practices, instead citing broader social cohesion as sufficient reason for such rights to be granted. Okin argued that by truly attending to this private sphere, it becomes clear that in granting special dispensation over certain areas of life, the rights of women qua women become secondary to the rights of the cultural group. As such, Okin posits that women from minority cultures may be better off if their cultures were to become extinct or helped by the surrounding dominant Western liberal culture to radically alter themselves.

However, as we should know by now, feminism and multiculturalism are by no means incompatible. In this paper I will argue that Okin's proposed dichotomy is largely overstated and provide a detailed critique of her work. I will first criticise Okin's essentialised conceptualisation of minority cultures as inherently patriarchal, and minority practices as inherently subordinating of women. I will argue that an examination of the ways in which minority women actually interact with their cultural practices reveals that they are not distinctly subordinating. Rather, they are often important sites for identity formation, aiding in the clarification of one's existence to oneself and providing a clear normative template (as well as tendentially providing a toolkit with which to make sense of one's subordinated existence at the hands of the dominant culture). Drawing on the work of Uma Narayan I will further argue that Western cultures rarely present a better feminist alternative.

I will then outline a novel multicultural strategy which will allow states to grant multicultural rights to minority groups in a manner which not only attempts to safeguard more vulnerable members of these communities from practices which they experience as oppressive due to their gender, race, sexuality and so on, but also provides safe avenues for them to bring forward accusations of discrimination once group rights have been granted. This strategy will draw from proposals put forward by Clare Chambers and Ranjoo Seodu Herr, neither of which is independently sufficient. Herr (2004) proposes a democratic approach to group rights to ensure that practices granted multicultural accommodation are ones which the least powerful members of a community are also willing to endorse. Chambers (2007) proposes a tribunal approach which can be used to provide a mechanism for individual or collective action against a cultural practice perceived to have discriminated against persons on the basis of their gender (or other arbitrary characteristics such as race or sexuality).

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16h30-17h : *Pause café*

17h-18h30 : *Multiculturalisme et Groupes minoritaires/ Multiculturalism and Minority Groups*

Modératrice / Chair : Esmá Bayçan Herzog

Sebastian Rudas (Université de São Paulo) : *Indigenous Peoples and Multiculturalism : Two Perspectives*

ABSTRACT

In this article I argue that the logic for justifying cultural rights and cultural preservation of the *egalitarian theory* of multiculturalism, the mainstream theory in contemporary political philosophy, seems conclusively at odds with the decision reached in *Arhuaco*. The main reason for this is that the Court made several mistakes – mostly metaphysical – in judging that cultural *preservation* justified, in *Arhuaco*, restrictions of individual basic rights. Considering that *Arhuaco* is a landmark decision that provides a linchpin about how to deal with conflicts related to cultural pluralism, this is a criticism of the structure of multiculturalism in Colombia. I dedicate Part I (composed by §§1-2) to develop this argument.

Insofar as Colombian multiculturalism is unacceptable from a liberal egalitarian point of view, it might be tempting to say: so much the worse for egalitarian multiculturalism. Why should a *liberal egalitarian* conception be the bar against which to assess the morality of Colombian institutional practices? Wouldn't this be an instance of cultural imperialism? Although these might be valid reactions, in this article it is not my intention to argue against egalitarian multiculturalism. Instead, I want to suggest that the institutional setting that Colombia has implemented – and this seems to be a direction Latin American countries adopting multicultural policies follow – is motivated by a *different* moral perspective, namely a reflection about state sovereignty over indigenous peoples.

In Part II, I identify what I argue is an independent perspective from which the justice of the relations involving cultural pluralism can be assessed. This perspective takes issue with the assumption that the Colombian state is sovereign over the territories of indigenous peoples. The recognition of rights to self-determination to them signals acknowledgement that such assumption, historically uncritically accepted by national ethnic elites, needed revision. §3 analyses the notion of cultural imperialism as a form of injustice. §4 shows how the injustice of cultural imperialism has operated in Colombia and why the Constitution of 1991 is an attempt to redress it. Part II, thus, shows that the *spirit* of the Constitution of 1991, when cultural pluralism is at stake, is to redress – whether sufficiently or not I leave aside – the injustice of cultural imperialism.

A common justification of cultural rights, and particularly of self-determination rights, is the metaphysical thesis that a characteristic feature of cultural pluralism is the incommensurability of value. Different cultural groups endorse incommensurable values and therefore each group should be entitled to make decisions autonomously. The purpose of Part II is to justify self-determination rights by another route: by showing the relevance of the *practical* – as opposed to

metaphysical – commitment to correct for historical injustice. I want to suggest that the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution should not be read as a philosophical exploration of the truth of the claim that there is a metaphysical conflict between the individual-oriented values of a liberal-democratic regime and the community-oriented values of a regime that commits itself to the preservation of cultural pluralism. The Court, alongside a number of scholars, sometimes offers this kind of reasoning. I want to make apparent that looking at the perspective described in Part II offers a compelling way of grounding the legitimacy of decisions that involve self-determination rights for indigenous peoples. My purpose, therefore, is to call attention on the fact that, if the state has sovereign authority over indigenous peoples, it is because it has acknowledged that such sovereignty is limited (or shared). It is by accepting this conditional statement that it is possible to explain tolerance of internal restrictions.

Sophie Guérard de Latour (ENS de Lyon) : *Une approche ciblée du multiculturalisme : le cas de la minorité rom en Europe / A Targeted Approach to Multiculturalism : The Case of the Roma Minority in Europe*

RÉSUMÉ

Une des caractéristiques centrales de la théorie de la citoyenneté multiculturelle tient à l’approche ciblée qui la fonde. Kymlicka soutient ainsi que les politiques multiculturelles doivent différer en fonction du type de minorités ethnoculturelles auxquelles elles s’adressent afin de répondre aux injustices spécifiques que leurs membres subissent. Les droits culturels sont voués à l’échec s’ils restent pensés de façon générique, c’est-à-dire s’ils sont accordés aux individus sans considération pour le type de minorité (nationale ou ethnique) auxquelles ils appartiennent. Le cas de la minorité Rom en Europe apporte un éclairage intéressant à cet argument. Lorsque Kymlicka aborde l’expérience du multiculturalisme en Europe dans *Les Odyssées multiculturelles*, il attribue son échec relatif à l’approche générique qui domine le droit européen sur la protection des minorités culturelles et il présente à l’inverse le traitement ciblé que les institutions européennes appliquent aux populations roms comme la voie à suivre pour y remédier. Dans cette communication, je propose de relativiser cette thèse à partir des résultats d’une enquête exploratoire que j’ai menée au sein du Conseil de l’Europe et de l’Union européenne en 2016. Il s’agissait de repérer et d’analyser les logiques normatives mobilisées par les services en charge des questions roms pour justifier l’approche ciblée sur ce groupe ethnique. Ce travail conduit à affronter deux questions: dans quelle mesure le caractère transnational de la minorité rom constitue-t-il un type nouveau de minorité ethnoculturelle susceptible d’enrichir la typologie de Kymlicka? Dans quelle mesure la cause des Roms peut-elle contribuer à faire avancer celle du multiculturalisme libéral en Europe, à partir du moment où les institutions européennes l’associent à la lutte contre le racisme plutôt qu’à la reconnaissance culturelle?

ABSTRACT

The « targeted approach » of minority rights is one of the key features of Will Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship. It argues that multicultural policies should differ according to the type of ethnocultural minorities they are designed for, in order to protect their members against the specific injustices they are exposed to. Cultural rights are doomed to fail as long as they are understood as generic rights, i.e. as long as they are attributed to individuals without consideration

for the type of minority (whether national or ethnic) they belong to. The case of the Roma minority in Europe sheds an interesting light on this argument. When Kymlicka examines the European multicultural experiment in *Multicultural Odysseys*, he argues that the generic approach adopted by European minority law explains its current failure, and he presents instead the targeted approach applied to the Roma populations by European institutions as the model to follow. In my presentation, I would like to test this statement with the observations I have drawn from an exploratory study I have conducted in European institutions in 2016. The research aimed at identifying and analysing the normative logics displayed by European services in charge of Roma issues when they justify the targeting of this ethnic group. This study allows to address two questions : 1. to what extent does the « transnational » character of the Roma minority constitute a new type of ethnocultural minority which is likely to enrich Kymlicka's typology? 2. To what extent does the Roma's cause contribute to promote the one of liberal multiculturalism in Europe as long as European institutions justify the former in terms of anti-racist policies rather than of cultural recognition ?

RÉFÉRENCES

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Sergi Moralès-Gálvez (Université de Limerick) : *Linguistic Domination: A Republican Approach to Linguistic Justice*

ABSTRACT

Linguistic justice is about the fair distribution of material and symbolic resources when dealing with one important dimension of cultural diversity: linguistic diversity (De Schutter 2007; Van Parijs 2011). However, no theory of linguistic justice has addressed the issue of linguistic domination. This phenomenon has been investigated primarily by sociolinguists. In general, they work on empirical questions, such as the formation of individuals' linguistic choices and the role of power relations in understanding those choices. Yet, no one has directly addressed the normative dimension of domination in the linguistic realm. Therefore, the fundamental questions I address in this paper are: *what is linguistic domination, and when does it take place?*

To tackle these questions, I embrace the republican tradition of thought because its primary concern is to face the problem of domination (Pettit 1997; 2012). The objective is to analyse the theoretical resources within this tradition of thought in order to reflect upon linguistic justice.

Before explaining how I aim to proceed, it is important to clarify that I deal with longsettled language groups (collectives, such as national minorities, established during centuries in a particular place). This does not mean that immigrant languages are not morally important. They are very important and a relevant source of conflict in some contexts. However, as Kymlicka (1995) explains, we need to analytically distinguish between immigrant claims of recognition and long-settled minority claims. The reasons and values at stake when talking about migrant's language rights can be a bit different than discussions on long-settled groups. Because they are easier cases, and for the sake of clarity, I will address the issue of linguistic domination always having in mind long-settled language groups, not migrant cases.

To answer the research questions, I divide the paper as follows: in section one I survey what has been said about the concept of linguistic domination (mainly in sociolinguistics literature) and show that there is a gap in the explanation of how it works and why it is problematic from a normative point of view. In part two, I briefly explain the republican tradition of thought and expose my basic argument on linguistic domination. In part three and four, I introduce the different existing typologies of linguistic domination, namely vertical and horizontal linguistic domination. I will argue the following:

There is vertical linguistic domination when political institutions are able to exercise uncontrolled interference over the linguistic status, conditions and practices of a linguistic group.

There is horizontal linguistic domination when a person or group is dissuaded and/or deprived of the ability to form *their* own perspective over their language use or, even possessing this capacity, other individuals or groups are able to exercise uncontrolled interference over their language use and conditions. In turn, within this category I also distinguish between pure linguistic domination (when there is actual interference over individuals' language practices) and submissive linguistic domination (when there is not actual interference).

Finally, I conclude the article arguing for a preliminary thesis: if domination can be exercised in the linguistic domain, individuals should be free from linguistic domination.

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VENDREDI 19 NOVEMBRE

9h-10h :

Anna Triandafyllidou (Université Ryerson)
Rethinking Membership under a Pandemic Crisis
Modératrice / Chair : Sophie Guérard de Latour

10h-11h : *Multiculturalisme et immigration / Multiculturalism and Immigration*

Modérateur / Chair : Helder De Schutter

Esma Bayçan Herzog (Université de Genève) : *Liberal Culturalism and Immigrants : Friends or Foes?*

ABSTRACT

Liberal culturalism includes the approaches of ‘liberal multiculturalism’ and ‘liberal nationalism’ (Kymlicka 2001; Patten 2014). They both value cultural membership of majorities and minorities in a society in order to respect liberal principles of equality and autonomy. While they have slightly different emphases on the priority and extent of majority and minority cultural membership, they largely overlap in their limited recognition of immigrant cultural identities. They both aim at striking a balance between thickness and inclusiveness of a common national identity as a basis of social cohesion in culturally, linguistically, racially and ethnically diverse post-immigration societies (Gustavsson and Miller 2019; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Tamir 1995). Against this claim, its critiques have shown that the welfare state aspect of social cohesion, empirical research is inconclusive to support that it is incompatible with immigration (Holtug and Mason 2010; Holtug 2019; Meer and Modood 2016). In this paper, I will raise the question, if liberal culturalism is of itself incompatible with immigration. In line with its critiques, I will argue that to the extent that it insists on basing social cohesion on a single common identity, it cannot sufficiently include immigrants. However, I will claim that departing from social psychological premises of these approaches, and paying attention to the literature on superordinate identities in social psychology, it can be reworked to strike this balance by conceptualizing multilayered common identities (Baycan Herzog, *Forthcoming*). In other words, I will rework liberal culturalism to accommodate immigrants based on multilayered common identities. Despite that some have claimed that at least liberal nationalism cannot be reworked this way (Erez 2019, 2020), others have already reworked it for the cases of multinational federations such as Belgium and supra-national political institutions such as the EU (De Schutter 2007, 2012).

Juliette Monvoisin (Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne) :
Multiculturalité et justice migratoire / Multiculturality and Migration Ethics

RÉSUMÉ

Mon intervention se propose d'éclairer le lien entre multiculturalisme libéral et justice migratoire. En effet, la plupart des auteurs abordent la multiculturalité comme un contre-argument servant à démontrer, d'un côté, que l'identité culturelle ne peut pas ou plus être source d'obligations migratoires dans un monde où les Etats comprennent tous des groupes culturels divers (Ruegger, 2007) ; de l'autre, que le tri des migrant.e.s à partir de leurs caractéristiques culturelles est incompatible avec un régime libéral (Joppke, 2005 ; Cole, 2000). Or, il semble au contraire qu'affirmer qu'un Etat peut être le lieu d'expression d'identités culturelles diverses, et que des droits collectifs en découlent pour ces groupes, devrait rendre caduque le soupçon de xénophobie planant sur toute politique voulant donner la priorité aux membres d'une certaine culture en matière d'immigration. La question est alors de savoir quelle sorte d'obligations migratoires peut engendrer une société multiculturelle, si l'on confère à ses groupes culturels des droits spécifiques. Dans cette perspective, je souhaiterais examiner et évaluer, au moyen des outils conceptuels fournis par Will Kymlicka, trois propositions :

(1) La première énonce que certaines communautés politiques libérales étant de fait multiculturelles, fonder leur politique d'immigration sur leur identité culturelle revient simplement à défendre l'accueil d'individus de tous les horizons culturels. Selon cet argument, un pays comme les Etats-Unis, qui a opté très tôt dans son histoire pour une société pluraliste, serait obligé d'ouvrir ses portes à des individus d'horizons culturels divers, sous peine de trahir son identité (Walzer, 1995).

(2) La deuxième proposition consiste à dire que, dans le cas où différents groupes culturels se trouveraient réunis dans un même Etat pour des raisons en partie indépendantes de la volonté de leurs membres, comme le passé colonial d'un ancien empire, il peut être légitime de faciliter l'immigration d'autres membres de ces groupes (Coleman et Harding, 1995). Ici, c'est la culture de chacun des groupes minoritaires « incorporés » contre leur gré qui détermine les obligations spéciales : les candidat.e.s à l'immigration issu.e.s des anciens pays colonisés auraient acquis du fait de la colonisation, en plus des droits universels à des conditions de vie décentes, des droits spéciaux à exprimer leur identité culturelle dans un pays où vivent déjà un certain nombre de membres du groupe culturel auquel ils/elles appartiennent.

(3) La troisième proposition prend au sérieux ce que Kymlicka appelle la « théorie non idéale », c'est à dire le fait que, d'un côté, la plupart des immigrant.e.s soient contraint.e.s à partir, et qu'ils/elles n'aient donc pas consenti à quitter leur culture d'origine ; et que, de l'autre, certains groupes culturels opprimés ne puissent trouver à s'exprimer librement dans leur pays d'origine (Kymlicka, 1995). Dans cette perspective, accorder des droits culturels collectifs forts, impliquant des obligations migratoires dans certaines conditions, aux groupes de réfugié.e.s déjà présents sur le territoire, et par ailleurs rarement « petits et dispersés », pourrait constituer une solution à la fois au problème moral de l'oppression, et au problème pratique de la répartition des obligations universelles (Perry, 1995).

Je défendrai la validité des deux dernières propositions, en arguant qu'elles sont les conséquences pratiques de l'existence de droits collectifs dans un contexte libéral. Cette démarche me conduira à interroger la distinction entre groupes nationaux et groupes ethno-culturels.

ABSTRACT

In my intervention, I wish to shed light on the relationship between liberal multiculturalism and immigration justice. Indeed, most authors approach multiculturalism as a counter-argument to demonstrate either that cultural identity can no longer be a source of migratory obligations in a world where all states include diverse cultural groups (Ruegger, 2007); or that sorting out migrants

based on their cultural characteristics is incompatible with a liberal regime (Joppke, 2005; Cole, 2000). By contrast, it is possible to argue that both the multiculturalism of society and the existence of collective rights for cultural groups should spell the end of the suspicion of xenophobia aimed at any migration policy that seeks to give priority to members of a certain culture. Then, the question I want to ask is the following: what kind of migration obligations can a multicultural society generate if its cultural groups are given specific rights? To answer it, I will examine three propositions in the light of Will Kymlicka's *Multicultural Citizenship*:

(1) The first one states that since some liberal political communities are *de facto* multicultural, an immigration policy based on their cultural identity would amount to welcoming individuals from all cultures. According to this argument, a country like the United States, which opted early on in its history for a pluralist society, would be obliged to open its doors to individuals from different cultural backgrounds, otherwise it would betray its identity (Walzer, 1983).

(2) The second proposition is that if different cultural groups are brought together in the same state for reasons partly beyond the control of their members, such as the colonial past of a former empire, it may be legitimate to facilitate the immigration of other members of those groups (Coleman and Harding 1995). According to this view, prospective immigrants from formerly colonized countries would have acquired as a result of their involuntary "incorporation" special rights to express their cultural identity in a country where many members of the cultural group to which they belong already live.

(3) The third proposal takes seriously what Kymlicka calls the "non-ideal theory", i.e. the fact that, on the one hand, most immigrants have not consented to leave their home; and that, on the other hand, some oppressed cultural groups cannot find free expression in their country of origin (Kymlicka, 1995). Having said that, the defense of migration obligations to protect the cultural rights of rarely "small and scattered" refugee groups already present in the territory might be a solution to both the moral problem of oppression, and the practical problem of distributing universal obligations (Perry, 1995).

I will defend the validity of the last two propositions, arguing that they are the practical consequences of the existence of collective rights in a liberal context. This approach will lead me to question the distinction between national and ethnocultural groups.

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11h-11h30 : *Pause café / Coffee break*

11h30-12h30 : ***Multiculturalisme et intégration / Multiculturalism and Integration***

Elke Winter (Université d'Ottawa) : *Easy Naturalisation and Multicultural Citizenship for Middle Class Men? The Intersections of Gender, Class, and Immigration Category Underlying Canada's Declining Naturalization Rates*

ABSTRACT

The logics of neoliberalism and globalisation, as well as changing patterns of migration reconfigure the social and cultural landscapes of the societies on both sides of the Atlantic. While tensions between ethnocultural majority and minority groups are not new, the taken-for-granted characterizations of these categories themselves have come under pressure. Who qualifies as member of the dominant group? Would that characterization change if we supplemented “group” by “class”? In times of rising social inequality, and ethnic/racial majority status does not automatically translate into economic privilege. Fortunately, in some contexts, ethnic/racial minority status is indeed no longer synonymous with subordinate class/status. However, the opposite is also NOT true: members of ethnic/racial minorities continue to suffer from racism even if they possess marketable human capital and belong to the dominant economic class. How then are we to rethink the pluralist inclusion of new citizens in, arguably, one of the most successful immigrant-receiving countries in the world?

This paper engages in a critique of liberal multicultural citizenship by means of an empirical investigation of Canada's naturalization process. In the first section, I debate Will Kymlicka's normative theory (1995) – for which Canada's version of official multiculturalism stood model in 1995 – to other theories of multiculturalism, interculturalism, and pluralist inclusion. I then use statistical material provided by the Government of Canada under an Access for Information Request to examine for whom the naturalization process leads to a warm welcome into one of the world's few remaining officially multicultural countries, and for whom citizenship uptake is cumbersome or not impossible. My data shows that Canada's overall naturalization rate (the number of citizenship certificates awarded in relation to foreign-born individuals applying for naturalization) fell by 10 percentage points to 86% between 2009 and 2019. While Canada is still a world champion in naturalization, it is evident that those who are failing citizenship acquisition are immigrants from Asia and Africa, women (lower success rates than men in all immigration categories) and individuals who joined Canada through non-economic streams, such as the family and refugee classes. The citizenship test is the biggest barrier to acquiring citizenship. Roughly 75 % of all citizenship refusals were caused by to a failure to meet the language or knowledge requirements. About half of the female resettled refugees who wrote their first test in 2016 failed the test (Xu 2018, 7). Third, I draw on interviews conducted with recently naturalized Canadians

to gain a better understanding of how the administrative stages (the application, knowledge test, and ceremony) of the naturalization process operate as enablers or hurdles to obtaining Canadian citizenship. The analysis shows that highly educated immigrants endowed with valued forms of human capital are naturalizing relatively fast and easily even if they are members of racial, ethnic or religious minorities. On the one hand, the perceived absence of cultural boundaries speaks to the strength of multiculturalism as national identity and ethos of societal integration. On the other hand, the dominance of (indirectly) economic, human capital and management related criteria involved in the administrative process shows that even at the level of naturalization, the state is testing for attributes associated with upper middle-class status.

My argument then proceeds to discussing what the empirical findings tell us about the boundaries of citizenship in the Canadian multicultural nation. I will argue that in the neoliberally defined multicultural nation, naturalization operates along the same econocentric logic that governs immigrant selection through the points system. While it should thus not come as a surprise that permanent residents who arrived as refugees and immigrants in the family class are struggling with the naturalization process, it is precisely these individuals who keep Canadian society afloat. However, for these individuals, liberal multiculturalism *as a form of practice* does not seem to work. They require strong family ties and community help centers to enable them to even become Canadian. In the last section, I will attempt a sociological theoretical critique of liberal multiculturalism as a vision for pluralist inclusion in a just society.

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Janie Pélabay (CEVIPOF – Sciences Po) : *Multiculturalisme libéral et politiques d'intégration des migrant.e.s* : « droits polyethniques » versus « valeurs communes » ? / *Liberal Multiculturalism and Migrant Integration Policies* : « Polyethnic Rights » vs « Common Values »

12h30-14h : *Pause déjeuner / Lunch break*

14h-15h :

Patrick Savidan (Université Paris II Panthéon Assas)
Éthique de la provenance : Ethics of Provenience
Modératrice / Chair : Juliette Monvoisin

15h-15h15 : *Pause café / Coffee break*

15h15-16h45 : *Approches alternatives / Alternative Approaches*

Modératrice / Chair : Marie Garrau

Matteo Gianni (Université de Genève): *Multicultural Citizenship? From a Formal to a Political View of Multicultural Accommodation*

ABSTRACT

In 1995, *Multicultural citizenship* has provided a terrific philosophical and political framework to provide answers to claims for recognition voiced by a wide spectrum of social and cultural groups. As Kymlicka himself wrote about 10 years later, multiculturalism had quickly become a kind of default position toward which one has to justify the non-consideration of claims for recognition of cultural minorities. Certainly, Kymlicka's liberal multiculturalism has raised several important criticisms, as the essentialization of cultural groups, the ambiguities of the notion of societal culture, or the argument according to which voluntary immigrants lose the right to create a societal culture in the immigration countries and therefore the opportunity to claim forms of autonomy. However, such a conception of multiculturalism still provides an important normative framework to think out just and fair modalities of accommodation of deep diverse societies.

It is more in the political arena that the framework has been contested (for instance the more *muscular* liberalism advocated by British Prime Minister Cameron in 2011). Western states have progressively implemented civic integration policies that seems to call into question some of the moral assumptions on which the multicultural project is built. Among the different reasons explaining such a trend, one seems particularly important in order to assess the legacy of *Multicultural citizenship*. It is the lack of theorization of citizenship in itself. Kymlicka has certainly figured out an important moral framework to support the multiculturalist project; but his conception of citizenship is not in my view clear and strong enough to ground the political conditions supporting the multicultural project itself. In fact, the multicultural citizenship suggested by Kymlicka is very much formal, based on liberal rights and the constitutional

recognition of minorities. But it does not say very much about the process of citizenship, namely how a model of citizenship can be envisioned in order to manage multicultural disputes or claims for recognition in ways that produce legitimate and inter-subjectively shared outcomes. In other words, *Multicultural citizenship* provides legal reasons to accommodate multicultural societies in certain ways, but does not address the political modalities – and therefore the political view of citizenship – supporting such accommodations. It entails the danger of a depoliticization of citizenship; and a de-politicized citizenship, is not citizenship anymore.

In this paper, I address this "blind" spot and suggest a democratic conception of citizenship supporting the fairness towards minorities inherent to the multicultural project. I maintain that if Kymlicka has done a great job in opening up the liberal conception of citizenship towards the rights of minorities, it is now necessary to figure out the political and democratic conditions allowing such minority rights to be endorsed by citizens in the name of a common and justified conception of democratic citizenship. Liberal democratic states should not conceive their public philosophy of citizenship as being a-political, providing rights stipulated as if they were outside the political process, or based on the national majority's injunction to immigrants to unilaterally adjust to particular values in order to be considered full citizens. They should promote processual modalities and procedures aiming at providing individuals the resources and spaces to be empowered and having equal standing. It is on this basis that the fairness inherent to the multicultural project will be preserved against the right-wing claims to renationalize and depoliticize citizenship that have been dominating the political debates during the last years.

Félix Lambrecht (Université de Toronto): *A Corrective Theory of Multiculturalism. Moving Beyond the Ethnic-Civic Dichotomy*

ABSTRACT

In *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995), Will Kymlicka constructs a theory of cultural rights structured by a dichotomy between two different kinds of ethnocultural groups – national minorities (Indigenous peoples and national minorities) and ethnic minorities (voluntary immigrants). Kymlicka argues that national minorities ought to be granted extensive cultural rights in order to ensure that they have access to their societal culture. In contrast, ethnic minorities (immigrants) are not entitled to the same breadth of rights since, in choosing to immigrate, immigrants “voluntarily relinquish” their cultural rights and consent to integrate into the majority culture (96). Based on this dichotomy, a state has an obligation to distribute significant cultural rights to national minorities, while not to ethnic minorities.

This ethnic-national dichotomy encounters significant problems. Critics have drawn attention to the fact that immigration is often not voluntary or that cultural rights are inalienable and cannot be relinquished (eg., Rubio-Marín 2003, Choudhry 2002, Young 1997). Even if defenders (eg. Patten 2016) are correct that the dichotomy has a strong normative foundation, it nevertheless lacks sufficient explanatory power to address new patterns of diversity and migration that fall outside its categories – eg., nomadic groups, refugees, migrant workers (Vertovec 2010, Kymlicka 2007). At worst the ethnic-national dichotomy rests on unstable normative foundations about consent and the voluntariness of immigration. At best, even if it does have a normatively secure foundation, it lacks explanatory power to address new sources of cultural diversity.

In this paper I offer a new way to structure cultural rights that avoids the problems of the ethnic-

national dichotomy. I agree with Kymlicka that Indigenous groups and national minorities have claims to cultural rights based on a *corrective* claim to correct historic and contemporary wrongs (107-120). However, rather than propose a different normative basis for ethnic minorities as Kymlicka does, I argue that we should take this corrective claim and extend it as the basis for cultural rights claims for all ethnocultural groups. I offer a *corrective theory of multiculturalism* on which all cultural rights are based on claims of corrective justice.

My argument has two stages. First, I argue that we should understand cultural rights in terms of relational egalitarianism (cf. Anderson 1999). I suggest that cultural rights are a tool to ensure that members of society experience relations of equality. Instead of viewing cultural rights as a primary good to be distributed, we should view equality between members of society as the good in question. The goal of cultural justice should be to ensure that all individuals can participate in society as social equals. When individuals are not social equals, justice requires correcting this inequality. And, when the source of the inequality is cultural, corrective justice requires allocating cultural rights to the disadvantaged groups. In the second stage, I argue that this corrective framework is able to provide a more nuanced account of which groups should receive cultural rights. Rather than assuming all immigrant groups fall into the idealized category of “voluntary immigrant” as Kymlicka is forced to (99-101), my view is able to offer a continuum of cultural rights based on the differences in disadvantages that different cultural minorities face. What matters is whether or not the minorities in question are disadvantaged on account of their culture, not whether or not the minorities immigrated voluntarily. Certain immigrant groups may not face any cultural disadvantages and, thus, do not need cultural rights. Other immigrant groups (or refugees, or temporary migrants) will face disadvantages and, thus, have claims to cultural rights on the basis of corrective justice to ensure relations of equality persist in the society. A corrective theory of multiculturalism, then, provides a stronger normative foundation for cultural rights and better addresses contemporary patterns of migration and cultural diversity.

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Helder De Schutter (KU Leuven): *The Dignity Case for Multiculturalism*

ABSTRACT

Will Kymlicka's has developed the context of choice argument for group-differentiated rights for national-cultural groups. An alternative grounding for such rights is dignity. In this contribution I outline the dignity argument for group-differentiated rights and then contrast the context of choice and the dignity arguments in terms of 1) their intellectual history, 2) their contemporary justificatory potential and 3) the kinds of rights and policies they end up justifying. 1) I argue that the context of choice paradigm stands in the Herderian-romantic tradition, whereas the dignity case is older and hearkens back to the humanist claim for vernacular development. 2) In terms of justification, I argue that, while the context of choice and the dignity argument can independently justify group-differentiated rights, a theory that includes both justificatory grounds is stronger because they can strengthen each other: firstly, the dignity argument aids the context of choice argument in withstanding the assimilationist claim that *any* cultural context – and not only people's *own* culture – may provide for choice; while, secondly, the context of choice argument strengthens the dignity argument by providing objective ammunition to ward off the objection that dignity claims are normatively weak because they rely on subjective feelings. 3) I argue that the context of choice argument justifies specific types of *absolute* group-differentiated rights that enable cultural choice (such as mother-tongue education or self-government rights), whereas dignitarian arguments are *relative* in nature: they seek to ensure that whatever group X receives is also had by group Y.

16h45-17h : *Pause café / Coffee break*

17h- 18h30 : *Neutralité, pluralisme, religion/ Neutrality, Pluralism, Religion*

Modérateur / Chair : Alexandre Gascoin

Ophélie Desmons (Université Paris Sorbonne) : *Le problème de la neutralité dans la citoyenneté multiculturelle : The Problem of Neutrality in Multicultural Citizenship*

ABSTRACT

For many liberals, state neutrality is one of the defining features of liberalism. In *Multicultural Citizenship*, Will Kymlicka nevertheless claims that a liberal state can legitimately take measures enabling some cultural minorities to persist. He knowingly rejects neutrality towards culture. But is this claim compatible with the liberal requirement of neutrality? I first examine Kymlicka's arguments against the idea that state neutrality towards cultural membership is both possible and fair. I then examine one objection that could be addressed to Kymlicka: that he misunderstands the liberal requirement of neutrality, which is about the justification of the law and not about its consequences. Focussing on Kymlicka's conception of the person, I finally look for a way to make his claims and assumptions compatible with a plausible conception of state neutrality.

Raphael Cohen Almagor (Université de Hull) : *Coercion by the Orthodox Minority in Israel*

ABSTRACT

Kymlicka has focused his multicultural scholarship on issues pertaining to minority rights vis-à-vis restraints that might be imposed on the group by the larger society. He believes it is legitimate and unavoidable to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights and explains how both can coexist. This paper relates to majority rights when a politically-strong minority imposes its illiberal conception of the good on society. This essay is not about protection of the minority against majority coercion but rather about providing protections to the majority facing minority coercion.

The aim of this paper is to provide critical analysis and to explain the power of the Orthodox minority in Israel to enforce its conception of the good on Israeli-Jews, many of whom do not share their set of beliefs. This is the result of lack of separation between state and religion in Israel and the monopoly enjoyed by the Orthodoxy to decide personal matters. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been struggling to reconcile the tension between its being a democracy and retaining the Jewish character of the state. These values are not easily reconcilable. As a result of the inbuilt tensions, basic civic and human rights are undermined.

First, the paper explains the composition of the Israeli-Jewish population and the main bones of contention. Lack of separation between State and religion leads to discrimination against women as well as against non-Orthodox Jews in the private sphere, in conducting their most personal issues of marriage and divorce. In Israel, women, secular Jews and Jews of non-Orthodox denominations are coerced by the Orthodox minority establishment. The Chief Rabbinate that at present enjoys a monopoly on all matters relating to personal status has a clear bias against women and non-Orthodox movements.

Section II explains why Israel adopted the Ottoman millet system to govern its institutions. The millet system serves well the interests of the religious minority. Kymlicka explains that while the millet system was tolerant of different conceptions of the good, it was not liberal as it did not recognize any principle of individual freedom of conscience. The system did not allow dissent for group members, and provided little or no freedom to change one's faith.

Section III discusses discrimination against secular and non-Orthodox Jews. The status of women in personal matters is especially problematic and calls for drastic reform. In Jewish law (halacha), the establishment of patriarchy negates the premises of gender equality, of respect for others, not harming others, anti-coercion and the preservation of the dignity of the person. Men are in position of power over women. While not all Israelis necessarily object to wed in a religious ceremony, many Israelis believe that the right to wed in *any* kind of ceremony – religious and secular – should be granted. Freedom of religion includes freedom from religion. At present, however, the Interior Ministry does not recognize a marriage unless it was conducted by the establishment Chief Rabbinate that administers weddings and divorce.

Section IV relates to discrimination against women in a number of spheres. It is argued that Judaism and liberal democracy are irreconcilable. A pertinent distinction is made between the symbolic aspects of religion and the *modus operandi* aspects of religion. As far as the latter are concerned, it is argued that separation between State and religion should be achieved; otherwise coercive State interventions in intimate private matters are unavoidable. Such interventions trigger frustration and resentment.

François Boucher (KU Leuven) : *A Multicultural Conception of Secularism*

ABSTRACT

In the last two decades, religious claims have been at the forefront of debates about multicultural accommodation. As Will Kymlicka recently claimed, commenting on the evolution of those debates, now ‘groups defined by religion want a seat at the multiculturalism table.’ (Kymlicka, 2015) In parallel to this inclusion of religion within the purview of multiculturalism, the fact of multiculturalism itself complexifies the landscape of religious diversity in Western societies. While it used to consist of a plurality of Judaeo-Christian groups sharing the same national identity and language, religious pluralism now also includes newly arrived immigrant religious groups who do not already share the national identity, culture and language of cultural majorities in host societies (Kymlicka, 2009).

In Kymlicka’s work, this addition of a new source of diversity is a rather recent topic, one that was not included within the purview of liberal multiculturalism in *Multicultural Citizenship*, for instance (Kymlicka, 1995). This should not have been a surprise for the readers at the time. Kymlicka had already claimed that religious pluralism should be dealt with through a classical liberal model of toleration. This model rejects Ottoman-style group rights for religious communities and asserts that Rawls was right in claiming that individual freedom of conscience provides the answer to the challenge of religious disagreement (Kymlicka, 1992; Kymlicka, 1995, p. 155-158). Religious pluralism, in this view, should not be accommodated through group-differentiated rights, but with the standard undifferentiated universal citizenship rights. In *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka explains that this does not apply to ethnocultural pluralism. Whereas it is possible for the state to fully achieve a separation with religion, it is impossible for the state to be entirely separated from ethnicity and culture. Religious neutrality is possible, cultural neutrality is not. Therefore, only cultural minorities need to be compensated with special group rights for the state’s incapacity to achieve neutrality (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 111).

This disanalogy between culture and religion heralds the difficulties of inviting religion to the table of multiculturalism and raises questions regarding the compatibility between the liberal approaches to religious pluralism (secularism and toleration) and cultural diversity (multiculturalism). On the one hand, the latter asserts, in a nutshell, that ethnocultural minorities should be protected from aggressive majoritarian nation-building policies by being granted group-specific rights and being positively recognized by the state. On the other hand, liberal secularism suggests that there should be some form of separation between state and religion in order to respect the rights of individuals to freedom of conscience. While multiculturalism seems to rely, in part, on the even-handed recognition of ethnocultural groups, the standard liberal variant of secularism deals with religious pluralism through a hand-off approach to religion.

In this paper, I argue that a fruitful approach to this tension must not think about what it means to open a seat for religion at the table of multiculturalism, say by trying to figure out what type of minority groups religious communities are – more like polyethnic groups or national minorities or something entirely different? Rather, we should invite (a slightly revisited version of) multiculturalism at the table of state-religion relations. More precisely, I will argue that thinking critically about the disanalogy between culture (mostly language) and religion regarding the feasibility or possibility of their separation from the state enables us to better understand what shape the separation between state and religion should take in societies characterized by the new landscape of religious pluralism.

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